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ABSTRACT: In recent work we have argued that so-called robust virtue epistemology 
exemplifies a version of epistemic individualism according to which warrant⎯i.e., what converts 
true belief into knowledge⎯supervenes on internal physical properties of individuals, perhaps 
in conjunction with local environmental properties. We have presented robust virtue 
epistemology with various epistemic twin earth scenarios which demonstrate that warrant 
supervenes in part on wider environmental properties, and which hence provide support for 
epistemic anti-individualism. In this paper we argue first that so-called evidentialist mentalism also 
exemplifies a version of epistemic individualism which faces a related epistemic twin earth 
scenario. We then argue that even though a knowledge-first approach in epistemology is in 
principle consistent with epistemic anti-individualism, this approach fails to offer a plausible 
account of epistemic supervenience. The upshot is that further support is provided for 
epistemic anti-individualism, and a prima facie case is made for embedding such an approach 
outside of the knowledge-first framework.  
 
 
1. EPISTEMIC SUPERVENIENCE 
 
With very few exceptions⎯e.g., Keith Lehrer (1997)⎯epistemologists have embraced the claim 
that epistemic properties (E) supervene on non-epistemic properties (N), such as natural, 
descriptive or physical properties. The relevant type of supervenience is typically that of strong, 
individual supervenience, stated in terms of metaphysical necessity.1 Consider the following 
formulation of epistemic supervenience: 
 
Epistemic Supervenience (ES)  
Necessarily, if an individual S has epistemic property E, then S has some non-epistemic property N 
such that, necessarily, any individual S* with N also has E.  
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Strictly speaking, the supervenience relation is reflexive, transitive and non-symmetric, yet it is best 
understood in the epistemic domain as holding asymmetrically⎯i.e., non-epistemic properties do 
not plausibly supervene on epistemic properties. Also, all (ES) says is that a pattern of variation 
holds between epistemic and non-epistemic properties. It is a further metaphysical question why 
these sets of properties co-vary; assuming (ES) is not to be regarded as an inexplicably brute fact, 
an explanatory account is owed of why S has E in virtue of having N. Following Terence Horgan 
(1993), call such an account ‘superdupervenience’. Moreover, assuming the supervenience relation 
holds asymmetrically, we also need an explanation of why S does not have N in virtue of having E. 
Putting the two explanatory accounts together will show why N is ontologically prior to E.2 Thus, 
suppose property realization is what superdupervenience amounts to. In that case, (ES) has it that 
whatever particular N realizes E is necessarily sufficient for E, yet might not have realized E. In 
short, E is asymmetrically necessitated by its realizer N. Before we consider distinct epistemic 
properties and the nature of the non-epistemic properties on which they allegedly supervene, one 
may well ask why (ES) should be true in the first place.  
Ernest Sosa (1991) has argued that all epistemic properties supervene on non-evaluative 
properties, because all evaluative properties supervene on non-evaluative properties, and all 
epistemic properties are evaluative properties. The conclusion of Sosa’s argument entails (ES), but 
not the other way around given that some properties, such as moral properties, are evaluative but 
not epistemic.3 Even more generally, physicalists agree that if their view is actually true, then all 
(positive, non-indexical) properties of our world (strongly or globally) supervene on physical 
properties of our world, where a property is physical just in case it occurs in current physical 
theory, or an improved version thereof. Since all epistemic properties are non-physical on such a 
theory-based conception, this physicalist thesis entails (ES), but not the other way around given 
that some non-physical properties⎯e.g., moral properties⎯are non-epistemic. 
 Let’s now ponder which epistemic properties (ES) might pertain to. A useful strategy is to 
begin with the paradigmatic property of having (propositional) knowledge, and then factor out 
other epistemic properties that must be instantiated if having knowledge is. Certainly, since 
knowledge entails truth, having knowledge is a property that supervenes at least in part on non-
epistemic properties, as long as truth is regarded as non-epistemic. Reflect that at least in the case 
of knowledge N is going to be a highly extrinsic matter. After all, the contents of S’s knowledge 
are frequently about features⎯environmental, historical, etc.,⎯which are well beyond S.  
Knowledge also entails (dispositional) belief; or so we shall be assuming throughout.4 But 
then if both belief and truth are necessary, yet jointly insufficient, conditions on knowledge, we 
can define warrant as the additional condition, whatever that may be, such that when satisfied 
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converts true belief into knowledge.5 Put differently, from knowledge we can factor out warrant as 
that which turns true belief into knowledge. We can then ask the question of whether being 
warranted supervenes on non-epistemic properties without having to worry about the factivity of 
knowledge.6 Yet, warrant is still a very complex epistemic property. For instance, being warranted 
implies believing p non-defeatedly, where this latter property involves the absence of various types 
of (rebutting and undercutting) epistemic defeat.7 For each of these, the question can be raised of 
whether they supervene on non-epistemic properties.  
However, we can set aside epistemic defeat by focusing on the slightly less complex 
property of having a justified belief. Justification aims for truth: a belief is likely to be true if 
believed justifiably⎯i.e., believing p justifiably raises the objective probability of p. Still, a belief 
can remain (propositionally) justified even if defeated, indeed even if false.8 The connection 
between justification and truth is not that of entailment. Having a justified belief in that sense is 
typically taken to be a property that supervenes on non-epistemic properties. That may have to do 
with the epistemic basing-relation, which is what converts propositional justification—i.e., having 
justification to believe—into doxastic justification—i.e., having a justified belief. That is to say, S’s 
belief is properly based, or well-founded, just in case S believes the target proposition p on the 
basis of the propositional justification that S has for believing p. Arguably, being properly based 
supervenes on non-epistemic properties, and so one might think that having a justified belief 
supervenes in part on those non-epistemic properties on which being properly based supervenes.9 
Finally, by considering propositional justification we can ignore questions about both 
epistemic defeat and epistemic basing. Typically, even the fairly simple epistemic property of 
having justification to believe is taken to supervene on non-epistemic properties. To say that S has 
justification to believe p means that there is justification available to S to believe p. For instance, if 
the justification that S has consists of evidence, then the evidence is accessible to S such that S is 
in a position to believe p on the basis of that evidence.  
 With these different supervenience claims in mind, let’s now turn to consider the nature of 
the various non-epistemic properties on which our epistemic properties—warrant, doxastic 
justification and propositional justification—supervene. Our contention is that these base 
properties have been assumed by many epistemologists to be what we call individualistic 
properties⎯i.e., physical or mental properties that are internal to the bodily boundaries of S.10 However, 
epistemic twin earth scenarios show that none of our epistemic properties supervene on individualistic 
properties. Drawing on our previous work⎯see especially Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011; 2012; 
2013)⎯we use Sosa’s robust virtue epistemology (2011; 2013) in §2 as a test case to determine 
whether warrant supervenes on individualistic properties. Our answer is negative. In §3 we extend 
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our epistemic twin earth scenario to demonstrate that neither doxastic nor propositional 
justification supervenes on individualistic properties. For this purpose we use Earl Conee and 
Richard Feldman’s (2004) evidentialist and mentalist stripe of epistemic internalism as a case in 
point. Finally, in §4, we argue that while Timothy Williamson’s (2000) knowledge-first approach to 
epistemology is compatible with epistemic anti-individualism, the approach confronts a problem 
about providing an explanatory account of (ES). The upshot is that a prima facie case is made for 
embedding epistemic anti-individualism outside of the knowledge-first framework.   
 
 
2. ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Any virtue-theoretic account of knowledge says that believing truly through epistemic virtue is a 
necessary condition on knowledge. Robust virtue epistemology (RVE) says that such a virtue-
theoretic condition is also sufficient for knowledge. According to Sosa’s (2011; 2013) version of 
(RVE), knowledge has a triple-A structure.11 Knowledge implies true belief, and a belief which is 
true is accurate. Knowledge also implies a belief which is formed out of epistemic virtues. A belief 
formed on the basis of reading tea leaves or crystal ball gazing cannot constitute knowledge even if 
true. But when formed through reliable cognitive abilities, which is how Sosa prefers to view 
epistemic virtues, the belief is adroit. Accuracy and adroitness are, however, still insufficient for 
knowledge, as is illustrated by standard Gettier-cases involving intervening epistemic luck. Consider 
a familiar case: through exercising S’s reliable visual apparatus S forms the belief that there’s a 
sheep in the field. In actual fact S sees a rock which looks just like a sheep, but S still believes truly 
because a sheep is hidden behind the rock.12 So, to rule out the possibility that the truth of a belief 
be down to such happenstance, Sosa requires aptness for knowledge⎯i.e., that the belief be 
accurate because adroitly formed.13 Apt belief, for Sosa, is knowledge.14  
 Now recall our definition of warrant as that which converts true belief into knowledge. On 
Sosa’s view, the conversion consists exclusively in the aptness of the belief⎯i.e., in its accuracy 
being through adroitness. Since no separate (modal or otherwise) condition is needed, his theory 
of knowledge is a version of (RVE). When S believes truly, all that is required for that belief to 
qualify as knowledge is that S meets a virtue-theoretic condition. And for S to meet that condition 
is for S’s belief to be true as a result of S exercising a pertinent cognitive ability. 
 As Sosa (1991; 2003) accepts (ES), an intriguing question is whether warrant, when 
construed in terms of aptness, supervenes on individualistic properties. Sosa (2007, 29; 2009, 135) 
explicitly conceives of cognitive abilities in terms of cognitive dispositions which have physical bases 
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wholly resident in whoever has those dispositions.15 This suggests that adroitness is an epistemic 
property that supervenes on individualistic properties. After all, dispositional properties are 
arguably instantiated, at least as a matter of nomological necessity, whenever their base properties 
are instantiated. But, by the lights of Sosa’s (RVE), adroitness is only one ingredient of warrant. 
The truth of the belief must also be because of adroitness, where the ‘because of’ at issue is to be 
understood in terms of the manifestation of a cognitive disposition. So, the question is whether 
disposition manifestation, thus understood, is a property that supervenes on individualistic 
properties. Consider the following thesis: 
 
Strong Robust Virtue Epistemology (SRVE) 
Necessarily, if individual S manifests cognitive disposition CD (to form true beliefs), then S has 
individualistic properties I, such that, necessarily, any other individual S* who has I also manifests 
CD. 
 
Cases involving intervening epistemic luck provide a reason to reject (SRVE). Suppose S 
and twin-S possess the same cognitive dispositions in virtue of being individualistic duplicates who 
normally occupy the same knowledge-friendly environment; call it their global environment. Add 
that they share causal histories, if you like. Indisputably, S comes to know that there’s a sheep in 
the field on the basis of looking at a real sheep in circumstances in which there are no fake sheep. 
However, twin-S forms a true belief with the same content on the basis of looking at a sheep-
shaped rock behind which a real sheep is hidden from view. The intervening epistemic luck 
arguably prevents twin-S’s belief from counting as knowledge. Importantly, Sosa’s (RVE) can 
handle such cases without conceding that warrant supervenes on individualistic properties: S’s 
belief is true through the exercise of S’s visual disposition, but twin-S’s belief is true through 
environmental coincidence. Since S’s belief is apt and twin-S’s belief is inapt, the former, but not 
the latter, counts as knowledge.16 
Let’s instead consider a Gettier-case involving environmental epistemic luck. Suppose S 
comes to know there’s a barn on the basis of looking at a real barn in circumstances in which there 
are no fake barns in the vicinity. In contrast, S’s individualistic duplicate twin-S forms a true belief 
with the same content on the basis of looking at a real barn in circumstances in which twin-S might 
easily have formed the same belief on the basis of looking at a fake barn.17 Intuition has it that the 
environmental epistemic luck prevents twin-S’s belief from qualifying as knowledge, but in this case 
no resources seem available to Sosa’s (RVE) to account for an epistemic difference between S and 
twin-S. Just as in the case of intervening epistemic luck, both S and twin-S possess the same 
cognitive dispositions in virtue of their individualistic indiscernibility and occupying global 
environments that are equally conducive to knowledge. Against this background, there is no 
reason why S and twin-S’s beliefs should differ in respect of their aptness. In particular, even the 
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truth of twin-S’s belief is down to an exercise of her disposition to form visual beliefs. After all, the 
local physical conditions that need to obtain for twin-S to manifest that disposition are identical to 
those that obtain in the case of S, such as a clear view of a real barn in close proximity. As we have 
argued elsewhere (Kallestrup & Pritchard 2011; 2013), the large number of barn facsimiles in twin-
S’s regional environment, beyond her local environment containing the real barn that she is 
currently facing, presents a nearby possibility of error which renders her barn-belief unsafe (and, 
for that matter, insensitive)⎯i.e., her cognitive success (true belief) is such that it could very easily 
have been formed in the same way and yet have been cognitive failure (false belief).18  
The following diagram illustrates our epistemic twin earth scenario: 
 
 Scenario I       Scenario II 
 
 
 
         
  
 
 
 
 
The explanation Sosa offers of why S has knowledge is that S’s cognitive success is because of her 
cognitive ability. That is, her belief is apt. The challenge, however, is to explain why twin-S lacks 
knowledge, since her belief seems to be no less apt. The fact that S and twin-S are individualistic 
duplicates embedded in physically identical global environments means that one cannot possess a 
cognitive ability the other lacks. And the fact that S and twin-S are currently located in physically 
identical local environments rules out the possibility that only one of them manifests that ability. 
So if S’s belief is apt, then so too must be twin-S’s belief. 
 Indeed, Sosa (2007) himself admits that some easy error-possibilities, such as those 
presented by barn-façades, are perfectly compatible with the aptness of twin-S’s belief. 
Consequently, Sosa must concede that twin-S has knowledge.19 This means that Sosa would 
endorse the following thesis about the manifestation of cognitive dispositions: 
 
Weak Robust Virtue Epistemology (WRVE) 
Necessarily, if individual S manifests cognitive disposition CD (to form true beliefs), then S has 
individualistic properties I under local conditions L such that, necessarily, any other individual S* 
who has I under L also manifests CD. 
 
Global: Real barns 
Regional: Real 
barns 
Local: Real 
barn 
S	  
Global: Real barns 
Regional: Fake 
barns 
Local: Real 
barn  
Twin-S 
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The problem is of course that many epistemologists follow Alvin Goldman (1976) in taking 
environmental epistemic luck to undermine knowledge simpliciter no less than intervening epistemic 
luck does. If that’s right, then not only does warrant fail to supervene on individualistic properties, 
as illustrated by twin scenarios involving intervening epistemic luck, warrant fails to supervene on 
the conjunction of individualistic and local properties, as illustrated by twin scenarios involving 
environmental epistemic luck. Instead, warrant supervenes, at least in part, on non-epistemic 
properties pertaining to (regional) environmental features beyond S’s immediate vicinity (or local 
environment). Put differently, warrant is not just anti-individualistic; warrant is radically anti-
individualistic, in that it is incompatible with both (SRVE) and (WRVE).20    
 
 
3. EVIDENTIALIST MENTALISM 
 
Having argued that warrant fails to supervene on individualistic properties, we turn now to the 
question of whether other epistemic properties supervene on such properties. Amongst those 
epistemologists who endorse (ES) vis-à-vis doxastic or propositional justification, there’s a familiar 
disagreement over the precise character of the base properties. Ironically, while these base 
properties are obviously not themselves epistemic, this disagreement often pertains to epistemic 
features of these properties. Here we have in mind the dispute between epistemic internalists and 
externalists, which primarily concerns doxastic justification, although the former occasionally 
formulate their view in terms of propositional justification.21 Call the non-epistemic properties on 
which being justified supervenes ‘justifiers’. Justifiers are the properties that confer justification on 
beliefs. Thus, epistemic internalists hold that the property of being doxastically justified 
supervenes on justifiers that are internal to S’s mind (or cognitive perspective), while epistemic 
externalists maintain that this property supervenes in part on justifiers that are external to S’s 
mind. The question is what this internal/external distinction delineates.  
So-called accessibilists claim that the internal should be understood in terms of what is 
reflectively accessible, in the sense of what one can become consciously aware of through 
reflection. So, on their view, being doxastically justified supervenes on justifiers to which S has 
reflective access. Consider: 
 
Accessibilism 
Necessarily, if individual S’s belief that p is justified, then S has reflective access to justifiers j such 
that, necessarily, any other individual S* who believes p and has reflective access to j also holds a 
belief that is justified. 
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To say that S’s belief that p is justified just in case she has reflective access to the properties that 
justify that belief can be taken in at least two distinct ways. Weakly understood, what is required is 
conscious awareness through reflection of the presence of those properties (i.e., the justifiers) that 
justify belief in p. Strongly understood, what is required is also conscious awareness through 
reflection that those properties justify belief in p.22 
Whether accessibilism counts as epistemic individualism depends on whether S has 
reflective access only to her individualistic properties. For instance, if S is deemed to have 
reflective access to justificationally relevant environmental properties beyond the skin-and-skull of 
S, then accessibilism as a stripe of epistemic internalism is compatible with epistemic anti-
individualism. Likewise, if by the lights of accessibilism, being internal is cashed out in terms of 
reflective access, then epistemic externalism is the view that the property of being doxastically 
justified supervenes on properties to which S need not have reflective access. Thus understood, 
epistemic externalism is compatible with epistemic individualism if the base properties (i.e., 
justifiers) on which this epistemic property supervenes are individualistic, yet such that S need not 
have reflective access to them. We shall not here delve further into the details.23 The point to keep 
in mind is that given the different ways the internal/external distinction can be drawn, the dispute 
over epistemic internalism is different from the dispute over epistemic individualism. 
Let’s instead turn to ponder a different version of epistemic internalism, namely evidentialist 
mentalism.24 Evidentialist mentalists and accessibilists agree that the properties on which doxastic 
justification supervenes are internal to S’s mind (or cognitive perspective). They also agree that 
justification consists in reasons or evidence, understood broadly as signs or marks of truth. But 
they disagree about what it means for such base properties to be internal. Evidentialist mentalists 
hold that only mental properties are internal to S’s mind, understood broadly to include occurrent 
or dispositional mental states, events and conditions.25 So, on their view only mental properties 
can serve as base properties (i.e., justifiers), and hence all reasons or evidence consist in mental 
states. More precisely, Conee and Feldman’s version of evidentialist mentalism (2004, 83, 204; 
2008, 83) says that, as a matter of necessity, S justifiably believes p if and only if S’s evidence (on 
balance) supports p.26 That is to say, the evidential facts and facts about doxastic justification are 
necessarily equivalent. Their mentalism then says that necessarily, there can be no evidential 
difference between any two possible individuals without a mental difference. That is to say, the 
evidential facts strongly supervene on the (totality of the) mental facts. Putting the two together, 
Conee and Feldman (2004, 56) accept that the mental fixes the justificatory status of beliefs such 
that if individuals S and S* have the same mental properties, then they are necessarily 
justificational duplicates.27 Bearing in mind that occurrent or dispositional mental states, events 
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and conditions all count as individualistic properties, consider the following formulation of 
evidentialist mentalism: 
 
Evidentialist Mentalism (EM) 
Necessarily, if individual S’s belief that p is justified to degree d, then S has individualistic properties 
i such that, necessarily, any other individual S* who believes p and has i also holds a belief which is 
justified to degree d. 
 
Thus formulated, (EM) is not merely a claim about the supervenience base for doxastic 
justification. This view also takes the gradability of doxastic justification into account: it says that 
the degree (or extent) to which S is justified in believing p supervenes on her mental properties. As 
Conee and Feldman (2001, 234) put it, it is a consequence of the supervenience of justification on 
the mental that “if any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike 
justificationally, e.g., the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent.” Observe that the 
non-epistemic properties on which doxastic justification supervenes are characterised metaphysically 
in terms of the mental nature of certain states, processes and conditions.28 So, evidentialist 
mentalists demarcate what is internal to an individual’s mind in terms of such mental factors. 
So far we have formulated evidentialist mentalism in terms of doxastic justification, but 
that raises the question of whether the basing relation can be fleshed out in mentalist terms. Conee 
and Feldman (1985, 93; 2004, 94) offer an account of that relation in terms of a belief fitting the 
evidence. The idea is roughly that S’s belief that p is well-founded (or properly based) if and only if 
having that belief is justified for S and S has justifying evidence e on the basis of which S believes 
p, where the latter is understood in terms of S’s belief fitting e. In response, Goldman (2012) and 
Juan Comesaña (2005) have argued that the prospects for explaining this fitting relation in 
evidentialist mentalist terms look dim. For instance, if S’s belief that p fits e only if that belief is 
caused by e, then it is hard to see how epistemic fitting could be a mental relation. Feldman (2005) 
suggests that since all evidential facts are mental facts, we can understand the causal relation 
between e and the belief that p as an instance of mental-to-mental causation, and therefore as a 
mental fact. But this proposal rests on a mistake: what makes mental-to-mental causation different 
from mental-to-physical or physical-to-physical causation has to do with the nature of the causal 
relata. Causation itself is homogeneous. In these latter cases there is no temptation to conceive of 
causation as involving mental forces, spirits, or what have you. Nor therefore should there be in 
the former case. 
Let’s therefore make the charitable assumption that evidentialist mentalism is only (or 
primarily) a view about the supervenience of propositional justification on mental properties. 
Nothing hangs on this since our objection applies equally to this weaker view. Given that the 
relevant mental properties count as individualistic, consider: 
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Evidentialist Mentalism* (EM*) 
Necessarily, if individual S has justification to degree d to believe p, then S has individualistic 
properties i such that, necessarily, any other individual S* who has i also has justification to degree 
d to believe p. 
 
In other words, whatever property turns S’s belief into a belief for which S has justification 
supervenes on individualist properties of S. 
In the following we shall mount a dependence thesis to the effect that propositional 
justification depends negatively on physical features of the environment beyond the individual who 
has that justification. Our dependence thesis is established by an epistemic twin earth scenario, which 
shows that when we vary such physical features, S and twin-S can differ justificationally despite 
being individualistic duplicates.29 
Our twin earth scenario in favour of the negative epistemic dependence thesis vis-à-vis 
propositional justification bears some resemblance to the new evil demon (NED) problem for 
process reliabilism, originally raised by Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen (1983). The (NED) case 
aims to show that reflectively inaccessible factors, or factors beyond conscious awareness, are 
unnecessary for justification. In effect, our twin earth scenario turns the tables on the (NED) case 
against the reliabilist. Before we proceed with our argument, it is thus worth revisiting the (NED) 
problem.  
Process reliabilism, remember, is the view that a belief is justified only if the process by 
which it was produced (and sustained) is reliable. Now imagine S in the actual (or normal) world 
and individualistic duplicate twin-S in a world where everything seems to be the way things are in 
the actual world. S and twin-S are experiential and doxastic duplicates⎯e.g., they share 
indistinguishable perceptual experiences. The only difference is that twin-S is deceived by a 
Cartesian demon into falsely believing everything S truly believes about the external world. Hence, 
only S’s beliefs about the external world are justified if process reliabilism is true. Twin-S’s beliefs 
are unjustified if being justified requires being produced by a reliable process. After all, the 
processes by which twin-S’s beliefs were produced led exclusively to false beliefs, and so those 
processes, unlike the processes by which S arrived at beliefs, are wholly unreliable.30 However, S 
and twin-S should intuitively enjoy the same justificational statuses (even though only S attains 
knowledge). (NED) is thus a challenge to the process reliabilist to accommodate an entrenched 
intuition that twin-S’s beliefs are justified no less than S’s beliefs.    
 A pressing question to ask is: what underlies the judgment that S and twin-S should hold 
beliefs with identical justificational statuses when the processes by which they were produced led 
to markedly different truth-ratios? Cohen (1984, 282) is explicit that his argument hangs on a 
normative (or deontological) conception of justification, according to which, “if S’s belief is 
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appropriate to the available evidence, he is not to be held responsible for circumstances beyond 
his ken.” In contrast, what (NED) purports to show is that the reliabilist’s probabilistic notion of 
justification is flawed in that reliability is unnecessary for justification. More precisely, there is no 
conceptual connection between such justification and objective truth-frequency. Rather, Cohen 
(1984, 284-85) maintains that being justified is simply a matter of being reasonable or rational.31 The 
only conceptual connection between justification and truth is at the doxastic level: if conditions C 
justify a belief for individual S, then C entail, not that S’s belief is probably true, but that S believe 
that certain conditions obtain which make that belief probably true.32 
 Interestingly, Feldman (2003) also explicitly employs (NED) against process reliabilism. 
Indeed, Conee and Feldman (2004, 155) take S in the normal world and twin-S in the demon world 
to be mental twins, and so to be justified (to the same degree) in believing the same propositions. 
But this conflicts with their acceptance (2004, 252-53) that justification is always an indication of 
truth. After all, the alleged justification that the radically deceived twin-S has is systematically 
misleading. Thus, Feldman (2005, 277) understands justification in terms of evidence or good 
reasons comprising the perceptual experience and doxastic states that S has to go on in forming 
beliefs, but he is adamant that such reasons are not to be interpreted deontologically in terms of 
fulfilling epistemic duties. Likewise, Conee (1992, 664-65) maintains that justification is truth-
oriented in that justification of p for S is evidence for S of the truth of p. Moreover, p is then 
justified for S when it is evident to S that p is true. In that sense possession of evidence is an 
indication of truth. And Conee and Feldman (2004, 252) identify all evidence that S can have for p 
with indications to S that p is true. Consequently, all justification that consists in evidence for p 
bears on the truth of p. In fact, Conee and Feldman (2004, 62-63) take their view to be defensible 
solely on non-deontological grounds.33 
 Since any view that construes justification (even in part) as a matter of objective 
probability, as opposed to subjective rationality, will face the problem posed by (NED), the 
foregoing shows that (EM*) is no better placed than process reliabilism vis-à-vis this problem. 
However, (NED) involves a skeptical hypothesis which raises a number of vexed issues to do with 
the nature of skeptical doubt. Let’s instead consider a scenario closer to home.34  
Consider the following dry earth twin scenario. First, consider S who is on earth where water 
plays the stereotypical role of being the clear, potable liquid which fills the oceans and rivers, falls 
from the sky, etc.,⎯in short, the watery stuff. On the basis of a veridical perceptual experience as 
of a jug containing water, S forms the true belief that there’s water in the jug. S is normally highly 
reliable when it comes to distinguishing (by sight, taste, etc.,) between water and relevantly 
different liquids. Moreover, the proximate conditions in which S makes her perceptual observation 
are normal. Against this background, S forms a justified belief in that S bases her belief on the 
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available justification that is provided by her perceptual experience. Now contrast S with her 
individualistic duplicate twin-S who has recently and unwittingly been whisked off to dry earth, 
which is just like earth except there is no water. Despite all appearances, on dry earth the lakes, 
rivers, taps, etc., all run bone dry. The entire community on dry earth mistakenly believes that 
there is a stuff which they call ‘water’ and which has all the watery properties. Based on a 
hallucinatory experience as of there being water in the jug, twin-S forms the false belief that there’s 
water in the jug. Apart from the missing water, the perceptual conditions are normal both in this 
case and in general. Even so, when on dry earth twin-S is obviously not reliable at all in telling 
when water is present, and so the pressing question is whether twin-S has justification for her 
belief, let alone can form a justified belief.  
From a purely deontological point of view, any justificational discrimination against twin-S 
seems unmotivated. The beliefs twin-S uses ‘water’ to express are as epistemically responsible as 
the beliefs that S forms about water. From the point of view of subjective rationality, neither is to 
be blamed for their doxastic behavior. But now switch attention to a non-deontological 
conception of justification on which holding a justified belief is a matter of believing on a basis 
that objectively probabilifies that belief. It seems equally obvious that S’s belief is justified in a way 
(or at least to an extent to which) twin-S’s belief is not. For twin-S to form a belief on the basis of 
what looks like water is almost bound to lead her astray. The experiential evidence twin-S has 
available is likely to produce very few, if any, true beliefs about water. Not so in the case of S 
whose belief-forming method vis-à-vis water is highly reliable. The experiential evidence S has to go 
on is highly conducive to the formation of true beliefs. 
 Given that evidentialist mentalists endorse a probabilistic conception of justification 
according to which justification consists in evidence which supports p if and only if it raises the 
(objective) probability of p, they predict that S and twin-S must differ justificationally. But since S 
and twin-S are stipulated to be individualistic duplicates, our dry earth scenario presents a 
counterexample to (EM*).35 Note that adopting a hybrid view on which justification is partly 
deontological (to do with fulfilling obligations) and partly probabilistic (to do with objective 
likelihood) provides no answer to this problem. As long as justification requires as a component 
the claim that a belief be formed on a basis which makes its truth objectively likely, there will be a 
clear difference in the justificational status between S and twin-S’s beliefs. Perhaps on the hybrid 
view that difference is one of degree of justification, but (EM*) is formulated in terms of the 
degree to which an individual has justification to believe p. Consequently, propositional 
justification fails to supervene on individualistic features. 
The evidentialist mentalist might object that the justificational difference between S and 
twin-S is, after all, down to a mental difference, namely S having a veridical experience while twin-S 
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undergoes a hallucinatory experience. In reply, the scenario can be tweaked to involve an illusory 
experience instead. Suppose twin-S* occupies an environment in which water (i.e., H2O) appears to 
have watery properties that it actually lacks. On the basis of an experience of water having some 
such property, twin-S* forms a false belief about water. Again, the individualistic duplicates S and 
twin-S* differ justificationally. Of course, the evidentialist mentalist might again insist that the 
justificational difference between S and twin-S* is due to the mental difference between having 
veridical and illusory experiences.  
A better response is to query whether these mental differences should count as 
justificationally relevant by the lights of evidentialist mentalism. We have already seen that Conee 
and Feldman (2004, 155) explicitly take S in the normal world and twin-S in the demon world to be 
mental duplicates despite the fact that only the former has a veridical experience. In fact, they 
seem to assume that the more transparent to awareness a perceptual experience is, the more justified a 
belief is if based on that experience.36 Thus, since the differences in veridicality between S and twin-
S/twin-S*’s experiences are opaque to awareness⎯i.e., these experiences are phenomenologically 
indistinguishable⎯they need not make for a justificational difference. Also, note at this juncture 
that the arguments which Conee and Feldman (2001; 2004) bring to bear in support of 
evidentialist mentalism all involve pairs of cases in which two individuals differ justificationally in 
virtue of mental differences of which they are transparently aware. Here is one of their illustrative 
examples:  
 
“Bob and Ray are sitting in an air-conditioned hotel lobby reading yesterday’s newspaper. Each has 
read that it will be very warm today and, on that basis, each believes that it is very warm today. 
Then Bob goes outside and feels the heat. They both continue to believe that it is very warm today. 
But at this point Bob’s belief is better justified.” (Conee & Feldman 2001, 3) 
 
Conee and Feldman take the mental change that Bob undergoes when he feels the heat outside to 
enhance the justification for his belief—a change that involves distinctive sensational features of 
which Bob is transparently aware.37 
 The upshot is that as far as Conee and Feldman are concerned, S and twin-S/twin-S* are 
mental duplicates, and so given (EM*) also justificational duplicates. But S and twin-S/twin-S* 
ought to differ justificationally if, as Conee and Feldman accept, justification is to be understood, 
even in part, as an objectively probabilistic notion.38  
 
 
4. KNOWLEDGE-FIRST EPISTEMOLOGY 
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According to Williamson’s (2000) knowledge first approach, no individual S is guaranteed reflective, 
introspective or otherwise privileged access to her evidence. On his view, S may have some 
evidence to which she lacks any such access, indeed she may be entirely mistaken about what her 
evidence is. Given that S’s evidence determines whether she has justification to believe a 
proposition p, this approach is at odds with the accessibilist claim that S has privileged access to 
the factors which determine whether she has justification to believe p.  
Instead, Williamson claims that only knowledge justifies belief. Since what justifies belief is 
evidence, it follows that only knowledge constitutes evidence. S’s evidence is thus equated with her 
knowledge (Ep = Kp). So, instead of using non-epistemic concepts such as those of causation and 
reliability to characterize the concept of knowledge, Williamson reverses the traditional order of 
explanation by explicitly deploying the concept of knowledge to elucidate, perhaps only a posteriori, 
the concepts of justification and evidence:  
 
“The concept knows is fundamental, the primary implement of epistemological inquiry.” 
(Williamson 2000, 185) 
 
Now, if the total evidence available equals the total knowledge available, then S is never 
guaranteed to be in a position to know what her evidence is. For if evidence were epistemically 
transparent in that sense, then Ep and KEp would be equivalent. Given Ep = Kp, that would make 
Kp and KKp equivalent, but (claims Williamson) Kp fails to entail KKp. 
What then about epistemic individualism? It should be obvious that Williamson would reject 
the epistemic individualist view that the properties of being justified and having evidence 
supervene on individualistic properties. He maintains that: 
 
“E = K is an externalist theory of evidence, in at least the sense that it implies that one’s evidence 
does not supervene on one’s internal physical states. But if knowing is a mental state […], then 
one’s evidence does supervene on one’s mental states.” (Williamson 2000, 191) 
 
Notice that Williamson seems to be drawing the internal/external distinction around the bodily 
boundaries of S:   
   
“The internal will be identified with the total internal physical state of the agent at the relevant 
time, the external with the total physical state of the external environment.” (Williamson 2000, 
51)39  
 
The reason these epistemic properties fail to supervene on individualistic properties is presumably 
that they supervene on knowledge, which is factive and in most cases pertains to environmental 
features beyond S. As a claim about individuation, i.e. about what makes something knowledge, 
knowledge is not a property that is internal to the bodily boundaries of S. That is consistent with 
knowledge being instantiated by S, and so in that sense being located within the body of S. But 
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knowledge is also a mental state, according to Williamson. Indeed, knowledge is the most general 
factive mental state⎯i.e., it is the mental state S is in if she is in any factive mental state at all. It 
follows that Williamson is a mentalist, or an evidentialist mentalist, in the sense that the properties 
of being justified and having evidence supervene on the mental states of knowing. Put differently, 
all justifiers are mental states. 
What distinguishes Williamson’s view from evidentialist mentalism as defended by Conee 
and Feldman (e.g., 2008, 87-88) concerns the nature of the mental states that can serve as 
evidence. While the latter regard beliefs as indirect evidence, only non-doxastic states, such as 
perceptual experiences, are ultimate evidence. Importantly, as we argued in §3, the veridicality of an 
experience adds no justificatory value. Conee (2007, 62-66) tentatively suggests that knowledge 
states can play a justifying role. However, due to the factivity of knowledge, it’s unclear how, by 
Conee and Feldman’s lights, such states can constitute evidence as they are opaque to awareness 
and so not wholly internal to the mind.40 In contrast, since Williamson only allows for states of 
knowledge to constitute evidence, on his view only factive mental states can serve as evidence. So, 
Williamson’s mentalism is non-individualistic in that the mental states on which evidence 
supervenes are all factive, whereas Conee and Feldman’s mentalism is individualistic in that the 
mental states on which justification (or evidence) supervenes are all non-factive. For Williamson 
justifiers are thus not individualistic properties in the way they are for Conee and Feldman. He is 
therefore not committed to any version of epistemic individualism; indeed his knowledge-first 
approach clearly implies anti-individualism with respect to the property of having evidence. The 
problem is rather, as we shall now argue, that this approach fails to offer an explanatory account 
of epistemic supervenience (ES).   
Williamson (1995; 2000, 28, 47-48, 51; 2009) argues that knowledge does not a priori factor 
into separate conditions—belief, truth and something else—which are individually necessary and 
jointly sufficient for knowledge. No such reductive analysis of the state of knowing is 
forthcoming. That is to say, knowledge is no compound of a mental state and a non-mental 
condition. Rather, knowledge is a sui generis mental state, or more specifically, the most general 
factive propositional attitude. To say that knowledge is a factive attitude means that ‘not-p and S 
knows that p’ is a contradiction. Factive attitudes matter to us. Williamson (2000, 39) takes their 
distinctive value to consist in having an essence that involves a matching between mind and world. 
To shift focus away from such factive states is to forgo the importance of that matching relation in 
our epistemic pursuits. Knowing makes demands on the world that believing does not. Notably, 
since believing is a non-factive attitude, believing involves no matching between mind and world. 
Here is Williamson: 
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“[…] to know is not merely to believe while various other conditions are met; it is to be in a new 
kind of state, whose essence involves the world. What is required is [...] rejection of a conjunctive 
account of knowing.” (Williamson 1995, 539; cf. Williamson 2000, 46) 
 
Williamson (2000, 33ff) says that factive, stative attitudes are expressed in natural language by 
factive mental state operators (FMSO), which combine syntactically with other expressions in the 
way verbs do, yet admit of no semantic analysis. More precisely, an FMSO Φ takes as subject a 
term S for something animate, and as object a sentence prefixed by ‘that’, but Φ is not 
synonymous with any complex expression the meaning of which is composed of the meanings of 
its constituent expressions. So, Φ is semantically unanalyzable: its sole semantic role is to denote 
an attitude. Examples include the verbs ‘know’, ‘see’ and ‘remember’. 
Against this backdrop, Williamson (2000, 37) claims that if Φ is any FMSO, then ‘S knows 
that p’ is entailed by ‘S Φs that p’. This proposal is the linguistic analogue of the claim that S is in a 
knowledge state with content p if S has any factive and stative attitude to p. It follows that ‘believe 
truly’ is not an FMSO, because S can believe truly without knowing. Indeed, that ‘believe truly’ is 
not an FMSO is also a corollary of the semantic unanalyzability of FMSOs. The mental state that 
‘believe truly’ picks out is that of believing. Truth adds nothing mental to the state of believing. 
Believing truly is both a factive and stative attitude, but for an attitude to entail knowing, the 
mental state itself must be sufficient for truth. So, given that ‘seeing’ and ‘remembering’ are 
FMSOs, their referents must be mental states sufficient for truth. 
While Williamson holds that knowledge is a sui generis mental state, he is not denying that 
knowledge entails belief. That is to say, belief is a necessary condition on knowledge, but belief is 
no component of knowledge.41 Instead, believing should be analyzed in terms of knowing: to 
believe p is to treat p as if p is known⎯i.e., when p is believed, p is treated in ways that are similar 
to the ways in which p is treated when known (e.g., as a premise in practical reasoning). Thus, 
knowledge sets the gold standard for belief. The more believing approximates to knowing, the 
more appropriate believing becomes. Belief simply aims at knowledge, and belief that fails to hit 
the target is a kind of botched knowing.42 
So, Williamson makes two related claims. First, the linguistic (or conceptual) claim that 
‘know’ is semantically unanalyzable in that ‘know’ is no synonym for a complex expression 
comprising ‘truth’, ‘belief’ and some other expression. We can take ‘knowledge’ to be shorthand 
for ‘warranted true belief’, but in that case the meaning of ‘warrant’ cannot be explicated without 
using ‘knowledge’. Second, the metaphysical claim that the referent of ‘know’ is a sui generis mental 
state rather than a motley of mental and non-mental components. That is to say, the mental state 
of knowing cannot be factorized into belief, truth and something else which is not knowledge. 
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The pressing question is now: if, as Williamson (2000, 186) claims, all S’s knowledge serves 
as the foundation for her evidence and justified beliefs, then on which non-epistemic properties 
do these epistemic properties supervene? Unless knowledge itself supervenes on non-epistemic 
properties, the latter cannot supervene on knowledge on pain of violating epistemic supervenience 
(ES), according to which all epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemic properties. After all, 
knowledge is a canonical epistemic property. But given what Williamson says about the nature of 
evidence and justification, only knowledge seems to be what constitutes the base on which such 
epistemic properties supervene.   
Importantly, one can consistently deny (with Williamson) that the concept of knowledge is 
susceptible to a reductive analysis, while maintaining that what is expressed by that concept 
supervenes on non-epistemic properties, as witnessed by what Sosa (1991, 153-54) calls pessimism.43 
Indeed, one can consistently deny (with Williamson) that knowledge states are metaphysically 
hybrid, subject to decomposition into purely subjective and objective components, while 
maintaining that such states supervene on non-epistemic properties (or states).44 So, neither the 
semantic unanalyzability of ‘know’, nor the metaphysical indivisibility of the referent of ‘know’ 
provide any reason to reject (ES). Indeed, to also deny (ES) is implausible as epistemic properties 
would be entirely autonomous, free-floating from the non-epistemic domain. For instance, beliefs 
are ordinarily regarded as justified only if some non-epistemic properties (i.e. justifiers) confer 
justification on them. Otherwise, justification would magically spring into existence and then 
inscrutably attach itself to beliefs. 
Moreover, Williamson ought to be sympathetic to (ES). In §1, we offered two arguments 
in support of (ES), the second of which hangs on a physicalist commitment to the supervenience 
of everything non-physical on the physical. Since all epistemic properties are non-physical by the 
lights of a theory-based conception of the physical, (ES) follows. As Williamson (2000, 52) accepts 
the physicalist thesis that “the total internal physical state of the subject and the total physical state 
of the external environment jointly determine the total state of the world”, (ES) is a claim he 
ought to endorse. The problem is that (ES) conflicts with putting knowledge first in an account of 
evidence and justification; or so we contend.  
Reflect finally that even if Williamson were able to accommodate (ES), a second problem 
would appear. Suppose that evidence and justification supervene on non-epistemic properties, 
because these epistemic properties supervene on knowledge which in turn supervenes on non-
epistemic properties. Remember that supervenience is transitive.45 As far as we are aware, 
Williamson has offered no positive account of which non-epistemic properties constitute the base 
on which knowledge supervenes. And the question is of course whether knowledge is still being 
put first if such an account would provide a supervenience base for evidence and justification in 
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terms of wholly non-epistemic properties. Be that as it may. The non-epistemic properties on 
which knowledge can be supposed to supervene arguably include experiential properties. For 
example, Williamson (2000, 197) tentatively suggests that experiences can provide evidence by 
conferring the status of evidence on propositions of which all evidence consists. Now we need an 
explanatory account of why our epistemic properties (to do with evidence and justification) 
supervene on certain experiential or other non-epistemic properties⎯i.e., we need to know how 
exactly the epistemic superdupervenes on the non-epistemic.  
Of course, Williamson may insist that (ES) is a primitive fact of which no further 
explanation or elucidation is needed. But to regard (ES) as an inexplicably brute fact goes well 
beyond what the knowledge-first approach involves in terms of the concept of knowledge or the 
state of knowing not being subject to reductive analysis or metaphysical decomposition. Indeed 
such an extraordinary claim sits badly with the widely recognized demand for superdupervenience 
in other branches of philosophy, including physicalist supervenience which Williamson explicitly 
accepts. If, in general, the necessary co-variance between physical and non-physical properties is 
no fundamental fact about our world, then there is no reason to think that the epistemic domain is 
an exception. Surely, any such co-variance between distinct properties, epistemic or not, holds in 
virtue of some explanatory metaphysical relation such as grounding, realization, or what have you. 
We conclude that there is a significant explanatory lacuna inherent within Williamson’s 
knowledge-first approach to epistemology.46 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Our reflections on epistemic supervenience have shown that the case for epistemic anti-
individualism which undermines canonical versions of robust virtue epistemology also extends to a 
prominent variety of epistemic internalism in the form of evidentialist mentalism. This further 
strengthens the hand of the epistemic anti-individualist. Moreover, although epistemic anti-
individualism is in principle compatible with the influential knowledge-first approach advocated by 
Williamson, we have also seen that reflecting on the nature of epistemic supervenience has 
exposed a new challenge for this approach. In particular, Williamson has more explanatory work 
to do when it comes to defending knowledge-first epistemology than hitherto recognized. This last 
point thus offers prima facie support for an alternative approach to knowledge⎯favoured by the 
present authors⎯which embraces epistemic anti-individualism while eschewing the knowledge-
first framework.47,48 
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NOTES 	  
1  For a helpful overview of the different kinds of supervenience, and of strong individual supervenience in particular, 
see McLaughlin & Bennett (2011). Note that, unless we stipulate otherwise, we will henceforth understand 
supervenience in terms of strong individual supervenience. 
2  For more details see McLaughlin (1995).  
3  See Turri (2010). 
4  See, for instance, Rose & Schaffer (2013). 
5  Here we follow Plantinga (1993) in his generic specification of warrant.  
6  Focusing on warrant has the additional advantage that we avoid vexed questions about the supervenience of belief 
content, or the physical vehicle that expresses that content, on non-epistemic properties. For more on these 
supervenience claims see Kallestrup (2011). (ES) should preferably be a claim about the supervenience of purely 
epistemic properties on non-epistemic properties.  
7  For a helpful recent survey of different kinds of epistemic defeater, see Sudduth (2015).  
8  As in the case of misleading defeaters. 
9  For a helpful recent overview of work on the epistemic basing relation, see Korcz (2010).  
10 We shall not discuss the extended mind/cognition thesis in this paper, as in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Everything 
we say applies mutatis mutandis if individualistic properties are understood to include mental properties or cognitive 
processes that extend beyond the bodily boundaries of the individual in question. For more on how to extend the 
extended mind/cognition thesis to epistemology, see Carter and Kallestrup (forthcoming).  
11  For two prominent defences of alternative versions of (RVE), see Zagzebski (e.g., 1996; 1999) and Greco (e.g., 
2009). 
12  This Gettier-style example was originally due to Chisholm (1977, 105).	  	  
13  In more recent work, Sosa (2013; 2015) proposes a triple-S analysis of a complete competence comprising an 
innermost S-competence, which is the seat (or skill), an inner SS-competence, which is the combination of seat and 
shape, and a complete SSS-competence, which is the conjunction of seat, shape and situation. The connection 
between the triple-A analysis of a performance and the triple-S analysis of a competence is the following: a 
performance is apt when its success manifests competence, which happens just in case the innermost skill causally 
produces the success in combination with the appropriate shape and situation. The seat of the competence is 
determined as the causal basis for a success-response of an object when subjected to a stimulus in certain shape and 
situation combinations.  
14  Or rather, apt belief is what Sosa calls “animal” knowledge. In contrast, reflective knowledge is apt belief that one’s 
first-order belief is apt.  
15  Interestingly, in the specific context of social epistemology, Sosa (2007, 93-98; 2011, 86-90) argues that testimonial 
knowledge involves complex competences that are socially seated, or seated in a group collectively. But our claim is 
that all kinds of warrant fail to supervene on individualistic properties of S.  
16  Here’s a residual worry: if Sosa admits that warrant fails to supervene on individualistic properties, the question 
arises of how knowledge can be viewed as a cognitive achievement for which the individual deserves full credit. Is part 
of the credit not due to knowledge-conducive features of the proximate environment? For a negative answer see Jarvis 
(2013).  
17  The ‘barn façade’ case was originally described in Goldman (1976), and credited to Carl Ginet. 
18  The distinction between environmental and intervening epistemic luck is drawn, and further elaborated on, in 
Pritchard (2009a; 2009b, chs. 3-4; 2009c; 2012a; Pritchard, Millar & Haddock 2010, chs. 2-4). 
19  Sosa (2007) attempts to explain away the intuition that twin-S lacks knowledge by claiming that, while 
environmental epistemic luck is compatible with animal knowledge, such luck does undermine reflective knowledge. 
We argue in Kallestrup & Pritchard (forthcoming) that when reflective knowledge is construed as meta-apt belief, a 
corresponding argument from epistemic twin scenarios shows that environmental epistemic luck equally undermines 
reflective knowledge. A bolder tack is instead to adopt Turri’s (2011) revisionary theory according to which knowledge 
simpliciter is incompatible with intervening epistemic luck yet fully compatible with environmental epistemic luck.  
20  At root, the question in play here is whether knowledge demands safety⎯viz., that when one knows, one’s 
cognitive success (true belief) could not have very easily been (by the same method of belief-formation) cognitive 
failure (false belief). For further discussion of safety, see Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000), and 
Pritchard (2002; 2005; 2007; 2012a; 2012c; 2015a). For a recent exchange on the specific question of whether 
knowledge demands safety, see Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013).  
21  For example, the evidentialist epistemic internalist position defended by Conee & Feldman (2004)⎯and which we 
will be considering in detail below⎯is expressed in terms of propositional justification.  
22  For two key defences of accessibilism, see Chisholm (1977) and Bonjour (1985, ch. 2).  
23  For more details, see Kallestrup (2015). 
24  For the core defence of evidentialist mentalism, see Conee & Feldman (2004). For some useful discussions of the 
debate between accessibilists and mentalists, see Steup (1999), Pryor (2001, §3), Bonjour (2002), Pappas (2005), and 
the papers collected in Dougherty (2011). 
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25  Here we shall equate an occurrent state with a conscious state, and we shall take a dispositional state to be a non-
occurrent state. Hence, dispositional states are not conscious states. 
26  Conee & Feldman (2008, 85-86) sketch different kinds of evidence. Their preferred notion is that of justifying 
evidence: for S to have evidence for p is for S to have a reason to believe p (i.e., justifying evidence is something S 
could cite as a justifying basis for belief in p. Note also that evidence, on their usage, is always evidence for 
someone⎯i.e., it is always something that someone has. 
27  Elsewhere Conee & Feldman (2004, 101) maintain that justification supervenes on evidence. Given their mentalist 
claim that evidence supervenes on the mental, it follows via transitivity of supervenience that justification supervenes 
on the mental. 
28  As Conee (2007, 51) puts it, “mentalism is the thesis that for epistemic purposes, the ‘internal’ is the mental.” See 
also Conee & Feldman (1985, 55). 
29  The following epistemic twin earth scenario and the concomitant epistemic dependence thesis are developed in 
more detail in Kallestrup (2015). 
30  Cohen (1984, 281-23). 
31  Interestingly, pretty much the same conception of justification undergirds the epistemic intuition that is operative in 
contemporary internalist defenses of the (NED) problem, such as in Huemer (1999) and Wedgwood (2002). 
32  Reliabilists take the connection between justification and truth to be captured by the conceptual claim that if 
conditions C justify a belief for individual S, then C makes that belief probably true. They typically reject the 
infallibilist claim that C entails the truth of S’s belief if C justifies that belief for S. 
33  If justification is taken not to require an objective indication of truth, then it’s hard to explain how justification can 
be a guide to knowledge. We defined warrant as that which converts true belief into knowledge. Given that 
justification is an indispensable component of warrant, justification plays a key role in converting true beliefs into 
knowledge. Absent cases of improper basing and epistemic defeat, justification is exactly what makes the difference 
between true belief and knowledge. Justification may play additional deontological roles, but if we sever any 
connection with truth, we cannot take justification as a guide to knowledge.    
34  Other philosophers have also argued that (NED) or similar cases pose a problem for epistemic internalist accounts. 
Gibbons (1996) used the possibility of unpossessed evidence that one ought to have possessed to argue against 
accessibilism, by relying on cases where two introspectively identical individuals differ in respect of whether they fulfil 
their epistemic obligations. Lyons (2013) points out that (NED) presents a problem for what he calls “seemings 
internalism”, the view that S is prima facie justified in believing that p if S is appeared to as if p. Lyons’ argument hinges 
on the claim that memory, deduction, etc., are conditionally reliable even in the demon world. Moon (2013) uses 
(NED) against forms of epistemic internalism which rely on S and deceived duplicate twin-S being internally identical 
except that a number of S*’s un-accessed internal states are deleted by a demon and then replaced with 
phenomenologically indistinguishable occurrent states. Goldberg (2012) defines being doxastically justified as the 
property that turns true un-Gettiered belief into knowledge. On the basis of a (NED) case, he then concludes that no 
property that is internal in the internalist sense is the property of being doxastically justified. Our twin scenario is 
different from all of these. It relies neither on the distinction between categorically and conditionally reliable 
processes, nor on the distinction between accessed and unaccessed mental states, nor on intuitions about knowledge-
ascriptions. 
35  A friend of evidentialist mentalism may question whether in our dry earth twin scenario S and twin-S are 
individualistic duplicates for the reason that they fail to share content-bearing mental states due to the physical 
differences in their environments. Thus, Conee (2007, 57-58, 63) explicitly adopts wide content mental states as part 
of the supervenience base for propositional justification. In response, one should first note that the content of their 
beliefs—i.e. that there’s water in the jug—is descriptive, which therefore need not be individuated by environmental 
features. Secondly, many semantic externalists accept that tokens of ‘water’ express the concept of water even in a dry 
earth scenario. This means that S and twin-S’s utterances of sentences containing ‘water’ both express propositions 
containing that concept, hence both are in belief states the content of which includes that concept. For more details 
see Kallestrup (2011; 2015). 
36  See Conee & Feldman (2008, 100). 
37  For more detailed discussion of responses to epistemic dry earth scenarios on behalf of evidentialist mentalism, see 
Kallestrup (2015). 
38  Interestingly, some non-classical versions of epistemic internalism explicitly disavow a commitment to (NED). This 
is true, for example, of epistemological disjunctivism, a proposal rooted in the work of McDowell (e.g., 1995) and 
developed at length in Pritchard (2008; 2012b; 2015b; cf. Neta & Pritchard 2007). See, in particular, Pritchard (2011), 
which explicitly contrasts epistemological disjunctivism with evidentialist mentalism. The problems facing views such 
as evidentalist mentalism when it comes to its adherence to (NED) thus offer prima facie support for these non-
classical proposals, which are in principle better placed to accommodate the arguments in support of epistemic anti-
individualism. For an important recent discussion of the relationship between (NED) and epistemic internalism, see 
Littlejohn (2012).  
39 What Williamson is saying here is admittedly consistent with an extended conception of the mental/cognitive, but 
as mentioned in fn. 10, we are setting the extended mind/cognition thesis aside in this paper. 
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40  See also Conee & Feldman (2008, 99-101). Wedgewood (2002) defends a version of mentalism according to which 
justification supervenes on non-factive mental states, as well as explanatory relations between those states. 
41  See Williamson (2000, 41ff). Notice that this stance raises the question of whether a true sentence of the form ‘S 
knows that p’ ascribes two distinct mental states to S. 
42  Williamson offers surprisingly little by way of actual argument for the primacy of knowledge over belief vis-à-vis 
mental states. True, only knowledge is factive, and so only knowledge is a matching attitude between mind and world, 
but no substantial account is given of why such a matching relation can obtain only if knowledge is a sui generis, non-
decomposable, mental state. 
43  In philosophy of mind, for instance, many physicalists accept that mental concepts, and phenomenal concepts in 
particular, cannot be reductively analyzed, yet they take all such concepts to express properties that supervene on non-
mental properties. 
44  Again, few physicalists regard phenomenal consciousness as a metaphysical hybrid, but that is perfectly consistent 
with supervening on physical properties. 
45 As mentioned earlier, supervenience is also reflexive, and so knowledge trivially supervenes on knowledge. The key 
point is that (ES) demands that knowledge also supervenes on non-epistemic properties. 
46  For a very helpful recent critical appraisal of knowledge-first epistemology⎯albeit one which explores very 
different ground to that set out here⎯see McGlynn (2014).  
47  In particular, we have elsewhere argued for a conception of knowledge which includes both a virtue-theoretic and 
an anti-luck condition. See, for example, Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 3), Pritchard (2012a), and Kallestrup 
& Pritchard (2013; forthcoming). 	  	  
48  An earlier version of this paper was presented (by JK) at the ‘Knowledge-First’ workshop held at the Eidyn research 
centre, University of Edinburgh, in November 2014. We are grateful to the audience on this occasion, including J. 
Adam Carter, Clayton Littlejohn, Heather Logue, Aidan McGlynn, and Martin Smith. Thanks also to J. Adam Carter, 
Emma Gordon and Ben Jarvis for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. This paper was generously 
supported by the award of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, as part of the Philosophy and Theology of 
Intellectual Humility Project at Saint Louis University.  
